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Morphogenetic Theory and the Constructivist Institutionalist 
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PhD student at the University of Leeds 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article engages with two meta-WKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFKHVWRVRFLDODQDO\VLVµPRUSKRJHQHWLF
WKHRU\¶DQGµFRQVWUXFWLYLVWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶DQGVSHFLILFDOO\H[SORUHVKRZWKHIRUPHUIDUHV
under the critical scrutiny of the latter. The key proponent of constructivist institutionalism, 
Colin Hay, has offered two detailed critiques of morphogenesis that criticise its position on 
the foundational sociological issues of structure-agency and material-ideational. Although 
+D\¶VFULWLTXHVDUHODUJHO\UHMHFWHGLQDQRYHUDOOGHIHQFHRIWKHPRUSKRJHQHWLFDSSURDFKWKH
process of engagement is seen to be particularly useful for morphogenetic theory because it 
allows a number of important clarifications to be made and it also opens up space for 
theoretical development. In the course of this debate, accessible introductions are given to 
both theories, and the similarities and differences between them are outlined, providing 
clarity to both. Therefore, although this article ultimately operates as a defence of 
morphogenetic theory, especially in the form proposed by Margaret Archer and Douglas 
Porpora, it finds a great deal of fruitful discussion in the constructivist institutionalist 
challenge.   
 
Key words: morphogenesis, constructivist institutionalism, structure, agency, culture, 
material, ideational, critical realism, social change, Margaret Archer, Colin Hay. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Colin Hay has offered detailed critiques of the morphogenetic approach on two particular 
occasions. Firstly, in his 2002 work Political Analysis, Hay lays out a critique focussed on 
the analytical dualism between structure and agency, arguing that this µDQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVP¶
LQHYLWDEO\KDUGHQVLQWRDQµontological GXDOLVP¶6HFRQGO\LQFROODERUDWLRQZLWK$QGUHDV
Gofas (Hay & Gofas, 2010), Hay refocused his critique on the analytical dualism between 
structure and culture, this time putting forward a wide-ranging attack as a point of departure 
for his own meta-theoretical approach: constructivist institutionalism. Ultimately, this article 
is concerned with defending morphogenetic theory and with opening up discussion about the 
design of its explanatory framework. Through an HQJDJHPHQWZLWK+D\¶VFULWLTXHVDQGKLV
constructivist institutionalist alternative, this article also acts as a relatively accessible 
introduction to these two theoretical approaches to social analysis.  
 
$QHQJDJHPHQWZLWK+D\¶VFULWLTXHVDQGZLWKµFRQVWUXFWLYLVWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶LVEHQHILFLDOWR
morphogenetic theory for a number of reasons. Firstly, Hay shares the morphogenetic 
concern with the structure-agency and material-ideational questions as the foundational 
issues of social theory (Archer & Tritter, 2000; Hay, 2002). In his detailed consideration of 
these issues (see particularly Hay, 2002, 2016), Hay offers theoretically sophisticated 
arguments in a clear, systematic and accessible format, an approach that partly accounts for 
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his significant influence in the study of politics in the UK. Furthermore, Hay begins his 
critique of morphogenesis from within a shared perspective of Bhaskarian critical realism 
(Hay 2002) before later moving away from this position (Hay 2005) and adopting a social 
constructivist ontology (Hay 2017; Hay & Gofas, 20107KLVPRYHPHQWLQ+D\¶VSRVLWLRQ
offers morphogenetic theory (and critical realism more broadly) the highly valuable 
opportunity of engaging with a former theoretical ally. Finally, a morphogenetic defence 
agaLQVW+D\¶VFULWLTXHLVQHFHVVDU\EHFDXVHWKHFXUUHQWUHVSRQVHLVLQVXIILFLHQW$OWKRXJK
McAnulla (2005) puts forward a morphogenetic defence and counterattack in response to 
+D\¶VFULWLTXHKLVDUWLFOHZDVSXEOLVKHGEHIRUH+D\DQG*RIDV¶V more substantial 2010 
critique.  
 
Therefore, beyond introducing the two theoretic approaches named in its title, this article has 
WZRPDLQSXUSRVHVILUVWO\WRUHVSRQGWR+D\¶VFULWLFLVPVZLWKDGHIHQFHRIWKH
PRUSKRJHQHWLFDSSURDFKDQGDFULWLTXHRIWKHµFRQVWUXFWLYLVWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW¶DOWHUQDWLYH
VHFRQGO\WRXVH+D\¶VSDUWLDOO\MXVWLILHGFULWLFLVPVWRVKRZWKDWWKHH[SODQDWRU\IUDPHZRUN
of morphogenetic theory requires further clarification.  
 
 
SECTION 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MORPHOGENETIC APPROACH 
 
Built from a critical realist perspective (Bhaskar, 1975, 1979; see also Archer, Bhaskar, 
Collier, Lawson, & Norrie, 1998; Collier, 1994; Sayer, 2000), the morphogenetic approach 
works from a number of basic beliefs about the nature of reality, which are derived logically 
but maintained with an appreciation of their fallibility. Sayer (2000) LGHQWLILHV³WKHGHILQLQJ
IHDWXUH´RIDFULWLFDOUHDOLVWSHUVSHFWLYHWREH³WKHEHOLHIWKDWWKHUHLVDZRUOGH[LVWLQJ
LQGHSHQGHQWO\RIRXUNQRZOHGJHRILW´p. 2). And, it is on this basis that Archer (1995) 
DUJXHVWKDW³ZHare simultaneously free and constrained and we also have some awareness of 
LW´p. ,QWKLVVKRUWVHQWHQFHIURPWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI$UFKHU¶VVHPLQDOZRUNRealist 
Social Theory, two foundational distinctions are captured: firstly, the distinction between the 
individual and the constraining/enabling/motivating social context, generally known as 
agency and structure respectively; secondly, the distinction between the reality of our social 
situation and our awareness of WKDWUHDOLW\NQRZQDV³WKHPDWHULDODQGWKHLGHDWLRQDODVSHFWV
RIVRFLDOOLIH´UHVSHFWLYHO\$UFKHU, 1996, p. xi). 
 
The first of these distinctions is only tenable on the basis of another central critical realist 
concept: emergence. On this particular FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIµHPHUJHQFH¶KLJKHUVWUDWDVXFK
as water, emerge from lower strata, such as hydrogen and oxygen, which in turn emerge from 
even lower strata, such as neutrons, protons and electrons. In short, an emergent entity is 
nothing more than (a) its parts, (b) the way in which they are arranged in relation to one 
another, and (c) the unique properties it holds as a result of (a) and (b). When we apply the 
notion of emergence to social phenomena, it can be argued that the social context emerges 
from individual thought and action, while avoiding the suggestion that it entails the 
introduction of some new substance; its unique properties derive only from its constituent 
parts and the way in which they are arranged. This allocates a causal role to the social context 
without reifying the context as some independent entity.  
 
,QPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\WKHHPHUJHQWVWUDWXPRIµVRFLDOFRQWH[W¶LVIXUWKHUGHOLQHDWHG
according to the material-ideational distinction. Archer (1996) insists that in order to avoid 
³GRLQJYLROHQFHWRRXUVXEMHFWPDWWHUE\HOLGLQJWKHPDWHULDODQGWKHLGHDWLRQDODVSHFWVRI
VRFLDOOLIH´ (p. xi)PRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\KDV³ERWKWRUHVSHFWDQGWRFDSWXUHWKHVXEVWDQWLYH
 Page 3 of 22 
differences between sWUXFWXUHVDQGFXOWXUH´p. xi). Porpora (1993) outlines these differences, 
H[SODLQLQJWKDWVWUXFWXUDO³PDWHULDOUHODWLRQVDUHDQLPSRUWDQWPHFKDQLVPEH\RQGWKHFXOWXUDO
UXOHVWKURXJKZKLFKRXUEHKDYLRULVFRQVWUDLQHGHQDEOHGDQGPRWLYDWHG´ (p. 212). Thus, the 
individual-context distinction and the material-ideational distinction are combined by Archer 
(1996) and Porpora (1993) to form a three-way split between individual, structure and culture 
(Archer 2013; 3RUSRUD%\UHWXUQLQJWRWKHEDVLFEHOLHIWKDW³ZHDUH simultaneously 
free and constraLQHG´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 2), the crucially relevant characteristic of the 
individual is seen to be a relative freedom, conceptualised as an internal reflexivity that exerts 
a causal force on the external world in the form of human agency (Archer, 2012). In 
summary, morphogenetic theory is based on a belief that there are three primary causal 
powers in society: structure, culture and agency. 
 
According to Archer (1995WKH³ILUVWD[LRP´RIPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\¶VH[SODQDWRU\
SURJUDPPHLVWKDW³VWUXFWXUHQHFHVVDULO\SUHGDWHVWKHDFWLRQVZKLFKWUDQVIRUPLW´ (p. 138) 
DQGWKHVHFRQGLV³WKDWVWUXFWXUDOHODERUDWLRQQHFHVVDULO\ SRVWGDWHVWKRVHDFWLRQV´S 168). 
For example, a politician will always operate in a pre-existing political system, even if it is 
their raison d'être to fundamentally reform that system; the consequences RIWKHSROLWLFLDQ¶V
attempted reform necessarily postdate the DWWHPSW7KLVµEHIRUHGXULQJ, DQGDIWHU¶VFKHPD
lies at the heart of the explanatory programme of the morphogenetic approach as a simple 
three-stage model of social change: conditioning (T1), interaction (T2-T3), and elaboration 
(T4). Because a distinction is made between the structural and cultural dimensions of the 
social context, there are two fundamental morphogenetic cycles, one between structure and 
agency, and one between culture and agency. Archer (1995, p. 169; 1996, p. xxvii) insists 
that these two cycles parallel one another, so that their functioning can be laid out in very 
VLPLODUWHUPVZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\³DYRLGVDQ\prejudgement of their relative importance at any 
time and makes it much easier to examine their LQWHUSOD\RYHUWLPH´$UFKHUS 275). 
As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, structure/culture exerts a causal influence on agents 
(conditioning); agents interact (interaction); and this interaction changes or maintains the 
structure/culture (elaboration). This simplified outline of the morphogenetic model is enough 
to show how the three primary causal concepts of structure, culture and agency are mobilised 
in a temporal sequence to form the basis of the morphogenetic cycle.  
 
FIGURE 1 ± Structural morphogenesis (Archer 1995) 
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FIGURE 2 ± Cultural morphogenesis (Archer 1995) 
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APPROACH 
 
In Political Analysis, Hay (2002) offers a critical engagement both with morphogenetic 
WKHRU\DQGZLWKVWUXFWXUDWLRQWKHRU\LQRUGHUWR³HVWDEOLVKDSRLQWRIGHSDUWXUHIRU>KLV@
preferred strategic-UHODWLRQDODSSURDFK´+D\ p. 117; see also Hay, 1995). While there 
is no space here to address structuration theory in any detail, it is enlightening to note how 
+D\DQG$UFKHUERWKXVH*LGGHQV¶VWUXFWXUDWLRQWKHRU\DVDSRLQWRIGHSDUWXUHLQWKHLU
respective theorisations of structure and agency. But, they offer starkly contrasting critiques, 
and subsequently depart in different directions. Archer (1995) accuses Giddens of 
µFRQIODWLRQ¶DUJXLQJWKDWKHHOLGHVVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\WRJHWKHUPDNLQJLWLPSRVVLEOHIRU
him to model their interaction over time. Hay (1995; 2002), on the other hand, accuses 
*LGGHQVRIµGXDOLVP¶DUJXLQJWKDWDOWKRXJK*LGGHQVVHWVRXWWRLQWHUWZLQHVWUXFWXUHDQG
agency, he inadvertently ends up with an analytical dualism in which structure and agency 
can only be studied in isolation from one another.  
 
As well drawing different conclusions from their respective critiques of Giddens, Archer 
(1995) and Hay (1995; 2002) also draw different conclusions from their critiques of the 
structuralist and intentionalist positions. Archer identifies structuralLVWVDVµGRZQZDUGV
FRQIODWLRQLVWV¶EHFDXVHLQWKHLUDSSURDFKDJHQF\LVVXEVXPHGE\DQGWKHUHIRUHFRQIODWHG
ZLWKVWUXFWXUH6KHWKHQLGHQWLILHVLQWHQWLRQDOLVWVDVµXSZDUGVFRQIODWLRQLVWV¶EHFDXVHLQWKHLU
approach structure is reduced to, and therefore conflated with, agency. Hay actually offers a 
very similar critique of these one-VLGHGDSSURDFKHVFRPPHQWLQJWKDW³SXUHVWUXFWXUDOLVP
HIIHFWLYHO\GLVSHQVHVZLWKDJHQF\>DQG@SXUHLQWHQWLRQDOLVPGLVDYRZVQRWLRQVRIVWUXFWXUH´
(Hay, 2002, p. 110). However, he WKHQJRHVRQWRDUJXHWKDW³WKLVRSSRVLWLRQRUdualism ... 
KDVWHQGHGWRUHVROYHLWVHOILQWRIUXLWOHVVH[FKDQJHVEHWZHHQVWUXFWXUDOLVWVDQGLQWHQWLRQDOLVWV´
(Hay, 2002, p. 7KHUHIRUHRQHNH\DVSHFWRI+D\¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH
morphogenetic approach relates to the justification for rejecting structuralism, intentionalism 
and structuration theory. From the morphogenetic perspective, this rejection is justified 
because such theories are built on a conflation of structure and agency. To Hay, these three 
positions, and indeed morphogenesis itself, are instead guilty of creating a dualism between 
structure and agency. 
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From this broader rejection of dualism, Hay (2002) offers a more specific critique of 
morphogenesis, arguing that in the morphogenetic cyFOH³VWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DUHQRWRQO\
DQDO\WLFDOO\VHSDUDEOHEXWRQWRORJLFDOO\VHSDUDWH´³LQWKLVVHQVHDQDQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVP
KDUGHQVLQWRDQRQWRORJLFDOGXDOLVP´p. 123). He goes on to specify the source of this 
ontological dualism by highlighting the role of temporality LQPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\³$UFKHU
insists that structure and agency reside in different temporal domains, such that the pre-
H[LVWHQFHRIVWUXFWXUHLVDFRQGLWLRQRILQGLYLGXDODFWLRQ´+D\, 2002, p. ³WRVSHDNRI
the different temporal domains of structure and agency is, then, to reify and ontologise an 
DQDO\WLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQ´p. 125). In other words, Hay is arguing that if structure is held to 
predate agency at an ontological level, then the two exist in separate temporal domains, 
meaning that they form an ontological dualism. The accusation that morphogenesis adheres 
WRµRQWRORJLFDOGXDOLVP¶DOORZV Hay to place it on the discard pile of theories that have failed 
to overcome the structure-agency dualism, along with structuralism, intentionalism, and 
structuration theory. 
 
In order to find a theory that not only avoids but also overcomes the structure-agency 
dualism, Hay (2002) turns to the strategic-relational approach (the SRA) of Bob Jessop 
(1996; 2001; 2005). The SRA is a meta-theoretical model that is primarily used by Jessop to 
explore the functioning and ontological status of the capitalist state (Jessop, 2007). To Hay, 
WKHDSSHDORIWKH65$ZKLFKKHODWHULQFRUSRUDWHVDVDIRXQGDWLRQDOWHQHWRIµFRQVWUXFWLYLVW
institutionalisP¶+D\, VHHPVWREHWZRIROG)LUVWO\LW³VHWVRXWWRWUDQVFHQGWKH
DUWLILFLDOGXDOLVPRIVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\´ (Hay, 2002, p. 127), which Hay clearly sees as a 
QHFHVVLW\LQOLJKWRIKLVFULWLTXHRIPRUSKRJHQHVLV$QGVHFRQGO\WKH65$DOVR³GUDZVupon 
the criticaOUHDOLVPRI%KDVNDU´+D\S 127), which Hay continues to see as an 
important source of theoretical insight (Hay & Gofas, 2010), even if his more recent works 
RQµFRQVWUXFWLYLVWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶QRORQJHUVWULFWO\DGKHUHWRFHUWDLQ key critical realist 
assumptions (Hay, 2005; 2011b; 2016; McAnulla, 2005).  
 
With the purpose of transcending the structure-agency dualism, Hay (2002) discusses 
µVWUXFWXUH¶DQGµDJHQF\¶DVFRQFHSWVDQGQRWDVRQWRORJLFDOHQWLWLHV, and therefore denies 
their existence as anything other than the theoretical constructs of social analysis. Therefore, 
WR+D\³QHLWKHUDJHQWVQRUVWUXFWXUHVDUHUHDOVLQFHQHLWKHUKDVDQH[LVWHQFHLQLVRODWLRQIURP
WKHRWKHU´+D\, 2002, p. ERWKFRQFHSWVDUH³PHUHO\WKHRUHWLFDODEVWUDFWLRQV´p. 127). 
On this basis, Hay advocates -HVVRS¶V (1996) theoretical blending of structure and agency 
into two alternative concepts: strategic actor and strategically selective context. Although 
Hay offers an accurate representation of JeVVRS¶VDQDO\WLFDOPDQRHXYULQJDVRXWOLQHGLQ
Jessop, 1996; WKHUHLVDSUREOHPDWLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI-HVVRS¶VRQWRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQ,n 
contrast to Hay, Jessop (2005, p. 48) suggests that the SRA shares more in common with the 
morphogenetic approach WKDQLWGRHVZLWK*LGGHQV¶DWWHPSWHGGXDOLW\RUHYHQWKDQLWGRHV
ZLWK%KDVNDU¶VµWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOPRGHORIVRFLDODFWLYLW\¶ 
 
When Jessop (2005) comes to reflect directly on the relationship between the SRA and 
morphogenesis, he seems to contradict Hay (2002) by adhering to the critical realist premises 
WKDWDUHWKHSULPDU\WDUJHWVRI+D\¶VFULWLTXH)LUVWO\+D\FULWLFLVHVWKHIRXQGLQJ
morphogenetic claim that structures pre-exist agents in any given context, suggesting that it is 
this distinction that leads to ontological dualism. In contrast, Jessop accepts and supports 
PRUSKRJHQHVLVRQWKLVSRLQWEHFDXVH³RQWRORJLFDOO\FULWLFDOUHDOLVPDVVHUWVWKDWVRFLDOIRUPV
pre-H[LVWLQGLYLGXDOVDQGDUHDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRIWKHLUDFWLYLW\´-HVVRS, 2005, p. 44). 
Secondly, Hay criticises morphogenesis for the more general distinction between structure 
and agency at an ontological level, again suggesting that this leads to analytical dualism. In 
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FRQWUDVW-HVVRSH[SOLFLWO\ZDUQVWKDWLIRQHGHILQHV³VWUXFWXUHDQd agency as mutually 
constitutive - DQGKHQFHLQVRPHVHQVHDFWXDOO\LGHQWLFDO´WKHQRQH¶V³DUJXPHQWODFNV
RQWRORJLFDOGHSWK´EHFDXVH³LWWUHDWVVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DWWKHOHYHORIWKHDFWXDOUDWKHUWKDQ
in terms of real mechanisms, emergent propertiesWHQGHQFLHVDQGPDWHULDOHIIHFWV´-HVVRS, 
2005, p. 45). As we shall see in the following section, it is exactly this point that McAnulla 
(2005) uses in his morphogenetic response to Hay. 
 
 
SECTION 3: A MORPHOGENETIC RESPONSE 
 
In defence of µDQDO\WLFDO duality¶+D\VWDWHVWKDW³ZKLOHLWPD\EHXVHIXODQDO\WLFDOO\WR
differentiate between structural and agential factors, then, it is important that this analytical 
GLVWLQFWLRQLVQRWUHLILHGDQGKDUGHQHGLQWRDULJLGRQWRORJLFDOGXDOLVP´+D\, 2002, p. 127). It 
can therefore be inferred that a duality is defined by two main features: firstly, it pertains to a 
µdistinction¶UDWKHUWKDQ a µseparation¶VHFRQGO\LWSHUWDLQVWRVWUXFWXUDODQGDJHQWLDOfactors 
or properties rather than structure and agency as entities. Because µDduality¶ distinguishes 
but does not separate, we can infer that duality allows for structural properties and agential 
properties to be interrelated and interdependent (Hay 2002). This is an important contribution 
from Hay, as it allows for a comparison with morphogenesis over both the ontological and 
analytical levels XVLQJWKHWHUPVµGXDOLVP¶DQGµGXDOLW\¶. Although the morphogenetic 
position advocates dualism at the analytical level, it actually advocates something closer to 
duality at the ontological level. In contrast, Hay advocates duality at the analytical level but 
at the ontological level he insists that neither dualism nor duality can be applied, a position 
WKDW$UFKHUODEHOVµFRQIODWLRQ¶%\GHILQLQJWKHWHUPVLQWKLVZD\ we not only have a 
much clearer picture about the difference between the two positions but we now also have a 
clearer path to engage in the debate between them. To establish the tenability of the 
morphogenetic position, we can make three points of clarity to demonstrate that although it 
advocates a structure-agency dualism at the analytical level, its ontological position 
UHSUHVHQWVDµduality¶LQZKLFKVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DVdistinct properties of social reality, 
are interrelated and interdependent.  
 
Firstly, although the morphogenetic model places structure as temporally prior to agency, this 
is not to argue that structures existed before agents historically³WKHLVVXHLVQRWDERXWWKH
chicken and the egg since even were ultimate regress possible, it would not prove very 
revealing ... DIWHUPLOOHQQLDRIPRUSKRJHQHVLV´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 75). The point is that 
VWUXFWXUHV³SUH-GDWHDQ\SDUWLFXODUFRKRUWRIRFFXSDQWVLQFXPEHQWV´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 168) 
but do not pre-date occupants/incumbents generally. Therefore, structure and agency have 
always existed together and, ontologically, they are not treated as different entities occurring 
in different temporalities but as different causal forces, one of which logically precedes the 
other. Secondly, Archer (2000a) argues, in response to a similar accusation from Anthony 
King (1999), that in any particular morphogenetic cycle ³WKHUHLVQHYHUDPRPHQWDWZKLFK
ERWKVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DUHQRWMRLQWO\LQSOD\´$UFKHU, 2000a, p. 465). At the analytical 
level they are treated as separate entities so that we can model their interaction: (i) structures 
FRQGLWLRQDJHQWVLLDJHQWVLQWHUDFWLQVWUXFWXUHGVHWWLQJVLLLDJHQWV¶DFWLRQOHDGVWR
structural elaboration. However, even when structure and agency are analytically treated as 
separate entities, they are both held to exist at each stage of the cycle; it is simply the case 
that one of the entities is causally active while the other is being acted upon.  
 
Thirdly, Archer (2000a), McAnulla (2005) and Elder-Vass (2007) all point out that the 
FRQFHSWRIµemergence¶DOORZVDQRQWRORJLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQGXDOLW\WREHWKHRULVHGEHWZHHQ
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structure and agency as causal forces, without falling into ontological dualism. As Elder-Vass 
H[SODLQVHPHUJHQFHLVWKHLGHDWKDW³DZKROH [e.g. structure] can have properties (or powers) 
... that would not be possessed by its parts [e.g. agents] if they were not organised as a group 
LQWRWKHIRUPRIWKLVSDUWLFXODUNLQGRIZKROH´(OGHU-Vass, 2007, p. 29). Therefore, structure 
emerges from agency and can only have causal influence on and through agents (Archer, 
2000a), meaning that the two can never exist in ontological dualism because they are 
necessarily interrelated and ontologically intertwined. Therefore, at an ontological level, 
critical realists such as Archer, Porpora, McAnulla and Elder-Vass, adhere to a belief in (a) 
the reality of structure and agency as distinct causal properties of reality, and (b) their 
LQWHUUHODWHGDQGLQWHUGHSHQGHQWUHODWLRQVKLSµLQWHUUHODWHG¶EHFDXVHDJHQWVand agency are 
FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWVRIVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHµLQWHUGHSHQGHQW¶EHFDXVHVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\HDFKRQO\
exist in the presence of the other. It is therefore possible to demonstrate the tenability of the 
morphogenetic view that analytical dualism can be applied without falling into the trap of 
ontological dualism.  
 
 
6(&7,21+$<¶62172/2*,&$/&21)/$7,21 
 
:HFDQQRZWXUQWR+D\¶V (2002) insistence on an analytical duality and ontological 
conflation of structure and agency, and how the logical relation between these two positions 
creates the following tension: if we are to deny the distinction between structure and agency 
at the ontological level, and therefore deny their ontological existence, it is unclear how and 
why they are conceptually useful at the analytical level7KLVSUREOHPLVYLVLEOHLQ+D\¶V
engagement with the fruitful, if theoretically constraining, coin analogy. In contrast to 
*LGGHQV¶VµEUDFNHWLQJ¶DSSURDFKRIVHHLQJVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DVIOip sides of the 
same coin, Hay suggests that structure and agency could instead be understood as alloys in 
the same coin. However, for this argument to make any sense, the coin would have to be 
FRPSRVHGRIWZRµDOOR\V¶in the first place, a position that would commit Hay to an 
ontological distinction of some kind. This in turn would seem to contradict the idea that 
VWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DUHDEVWUDFWFRQFHSWVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHUHDO³PHFKDQLVPVDQG
SURFHVVHV´RIVRFLDOFKDQJHDWKHRUHWLFDOYLHZSRLQWIURPZKLFKWKHFRLQLVQRWDQDOOR\RI
structure and agency but is instead solidly constituted by social process. 
 
7KLVJLYHVXVWZRSRVVLEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI+D\¶VSRVLWLRQHDFKOHDGLQJWRDSRWHQWLDO
theoretical problem. 
 Position 1. If social process is real but both structure and agency are merely abstract 
concepts for understanding that process, we are left with the following problem: why is the 
structure-agency issue important at the analytical level? 
 Position 2. If structure and agency are held to be two constituent parts of social process, or 
two causal forces within it, or two features of it, we are left with the following problem: 
why does Hay deny the reality of structure and agency? 
 
McAnulla (2005) interprets Hay according to Position 1VXPPDULVLQJ+D\¶VRQWRORJLFDO
stance as one in ZKLFK³JHQHUDWLYHPHFKDQLVPVRUVWUXFWXUHVDUHWUHDWHGDVPHUHµWKHRUHWLFDO
HQWLWLHV¶QRWDVUHDOHQWLWLHV´ (p. 36), which leads to the position that structure and agency are 
QRWKLQJPRUHWKDQ³GHVFULSWLYHDEVWUDFWLRQVZKLFKPD\RUPD\QRWEHRIXVHLQaccounting 
IRUHYHQWV´p. 0F$QXOOODDFFXVHV+D\RIµDFWXDOLVP¶WKHGHQLDORIXQREVHUYDEOH
social causes. When defending morphogenesis on similar grounds, Porpora (2015) critiques 
WKHSRVLWLRQRIµnominalism¶DVRQHLQZKLFKSHRSOH³GHQ\WKHUHDOLW\RIDEVWUDFWREMHFWV´ (p. 
170) on the basis that they are merely ways of describing more tangible objects. For example, 
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do structure and agency really exist, or are they just ways of describing social processes? A 
nominalist would deny structure and agency their own ontological existence on the basis of 
one of the following justifications: (i) relational objects are nothing more than the entities 
between which the relation(s) exists, and perhaps the features of those entities, and (ii) there 
does not seem to be any physical space in which relational objects exist (Porpora, 2015, pp. 
114-5). Position 1 can therefore be labelled nominalist in its denial of structure and agency as 
anything more than ways of describing tangible social processes. 
 
However, in response to McAnulla (2005), Hay (2005) offers a clarification of his position 
that would seem to defend Position 2³,FHUWDLQO\GRQRWGHQ\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIXQGHUO\LQJ
mechanisms (structure-agency complexes) which may be unobservable yet causally 
effeFWLYH´+D\, 2005, p. 43),Q+D\¶VYLHZWKHVHµmechanisms¶ DUH³VRFLDOSURFHVVHVLQ
ZKLFKVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DUHPXWXDOO\LPSOLFDWHG´ZKLOHLWLVVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\
WKHPVHOYHVWKDWDUHPHUHO\³DQDO\WLFDODEVWUDFWLRQV´+D\, 2005, p. 40). Therefore, when 
pressed, Hay seems to advocate Position 2, accepting the reality of structure and agency as 
LQWHUWZLQHGFRQVWLWXHQWSURSHUWLHVRIVRFLDOSURFHVVHVLQWKHIRUPRI³VWUXFWXUH-agency 
FRPSOH[HV´7KLVOHDYHVXVZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQZK\GRHV+D\GHQ\WKHUeality of structure and 
agency? Callinicos (2004: xxx) offers one possible answer when he claims that Hay 
XOWLPDWHO\HTXDWHV³EHLQJUHDOZLWKWKHFDSDFLW\WRH[LVWLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIRWKHUHQWLWLHV´
Callinicos argues that if we erroneously assume that entities must be independent of other 
entities in order to be real, then we end up denying the reality of everything. On this 
interpretation, Hay accepts the existence of structure and agency but fails to define them as a 
µreal¶EHFDXVHRIKLVLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHir ontological indistinguishability.  
 
7KHUHIRUHLWZRXOGVHHPWKDW+D\¶VRQWRORJ\FRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGHLWKHUDVQRPLQDOLVWLQLWV
denial of the existence of structure and agency because of their indistinguishability, OR he 
could be interpreted as advocating an ontological duality in which he fundamentally accepts 
the existence of structure and agency but insists that their close interdependence and 
LQWHUWZLQLQJSUHYHQWVWKHPIURPEHLQJODEHOOHGµUHDO¶:KHQZHWXUQWR+D\¶VPRUHUHFHQW
work, in which he has adopted the label µFRQVWUXFWLYLVWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP and in which he has 
claimed WKDW³WKHUHLVQRPDWHULDOERWWRPOLQH´+D\, 2016, p. 531), we find further 
indications WKDW+D\¶VRQWRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQLVXOWLPDWHO\FORVHUWRQRPLQDOLVPWKDQWR
ontological duality. 
 
 
SECTION 5: CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
In recent years, Hay has developed his sociological theory systematically under the label 
µFRQVWUXFWLYLVWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶VHHHVSHFLDOO\+D\, 2006; 2011a; 2016; 2017). Beyond his 
analytical duality between strategic actor and strategically selective context, Hay makes two 
further distinctions. Firstly, there is a distinction between the natural context and the social 
context, where the former is independent of our knowledge and understanding of it, while the 
latter is constituted by that knowledge and understanding (Hay, 2009; 2016). Secondly, 
building on the social ontology of John Searle (1995; 2005; 2010), Hay argues for a 
distinction between the institutional context and ideational context, where the former is 
dependent on knowledge but exists independently of conscious thought on a day-to-day basis, 
while the latter exists as FRQVFLRXVWKRXJKWDQGRQO\H[LVWV³DVORQJDVRXUWKRXJKWVDUHRID
SDUWLFXODUNLQG´+D\, 2016, p. 522). These three distinctions seem to be the foundational 
tenets of constructivist institutionalism and can be summarised as follows: the strategic actor 
can be distinguished from the strategically selective context (Hay, 2002); within the 
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strategically selective context, a further distinction can be made between the natural context 
and the social context (Hay, 2009); within the social context, a final distinction can be made 
between the institutional and the ideational context (Hay, 2016). The elegance of these three 
layered distinctions is a strength of the constructivist institutionalist approach, but the 
ontological status of these distinctions remains a problematic ambiguity. 
 
Because it holds institutions as nothing more than an analytical category, constructivist 
instLWXWLRQDOLVPLVIRFXVVHG³RQWKHSURFHVVHVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQGH-institutionalisation 
and re-LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQRQLQVWLWXWLRQVSHUVH´+D\, 2016, p. 526). These 
processes of institutional formation, institutional collapse and, most importantly to Hay 
(2016)LQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJHDUHKHOGWREHµpolitically contingent¶7KLVPHDQVWKDWEHFDXVH
institutions and events can be interpreted in different ways, there is political competition over 
their interpretation and subsequently over what actions should be attempted. In other words, 
institutions change, but they do not change on their own, they change as a result of actors 
understanding them and specifically as a result of the particular understandings that come to 
dominate. Therefore, acWRUVPD\EHLQVWLWXWLRQDOO\VLWXDWHGEXWWKH\RULHQWDWH³WKHPVHOYHV
towards their institutional environment through a series of subjective and inter-subjective 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVFRJQLWLRQVDQGQRUPDWLYHGLVSRVLWLRQV´+D\, 2016, p. 526). As a 
consequence, acWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU is informed by perceptions UDWKHUWKDQ³WKHDFWXDOFRQWRXUVRI
WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOO\FRQILJXUHGWHUUDLQ´+D\, 2016, p. 527). For example, where 
PRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRULVWVPLJKWDUJXHWKDWDGLFWDWRULVSRZHUIXOEHFDXVHRISHRSOHV¶
perceptions and because of the institutional context, a constructivist institutionalist would 
DUJXHWKDWWKHGLFWDWRULVSRZHUIXOEHFDXVHRISHRSOHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVof the institutional context. 
7KHVHµSHUFHSWLRQV¶QRWRQO\FRQVWLWXWHWKHVXEMHFWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHRILQGLYLGuals, but are also 
part of inter-subjective ideasZKLFKFDQDFWDVµFRJQLWLYHWHPSODWHV¶WKDW³DUHIUHTXHQWO\
HPEHGGHGLQVWLWXWLRQDOO\´+D\, 2016, p. 527). 
 
As a result of the above claims about the ubiquity of perceptions and understandings, a 
central claim of constructivist institutionalism (laid out in detail by Hay, 2011a) is that 
DFWRUV¶LQWHUHVWVDUHQHYHUPDWHULDOO\JLYHQ. They are DOZD\V³VRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG´DQG
³GHHSO\QRUPDWLYH´VRWKDW³LQWHUHVWVDUHSHUKDSVEHVWVHHQDVLGHDOLVHGSHUFHSWLRQV and 
SURMHFWLRQV´ZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\³GHSHQGRQWKRVHWKLQJVRQHORYHVUHVSHFWVYDOXHVDQG
DGPLUHV´+D\, 2016, p. 529). Combined with the view that institutions only exist as SHRSOH¶V
perceptions and understandings of them, this view of interests removes the possibility of any 
IRUPRIµREMHFWLYH¶RUµPDWHULDO¶LQWHUHVW+D\LVTXLWHFOHDURQWKLVSRLQWDQGRIIHUVDGHWDLOHG
critique of existing theories of material interests (Hay, 2011aFRQFOXGLQJWKDW³DQ\
conception of material self-interest whether that of the analyst or that of the actor ... remains 
SUHFLVHO\WKDWDFRQFHSWLRQDQGDFRQVWUXFWLRQ´ (p. 77). Hay (2011a) argues that to conceive 
RIPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWVLV³WRLPSO\WKDWWKH\DUHGLVFHUQLEOHIURP²since they are ultimately 
determined by²the cRQWH[WLQZKLFKWKHDFWRULVORFDWHG´p. ZKLFKLQWXUQ³LVWRGHQ\
WKHDJHQF\DXWRQRP\LQGLYLGXDOLW\DQGLGHQWLW\RIWKHDJHQW´pp. 78-79). This view of 
interests is a clear point of disagreement with morphogenetic theory, which sees objective 
µYHVWHGLQWHUHVWV¶DVDFHQWUDOPHFKDQLVPRIVWUXFWXUDOFRQGLWLRQLQJ$UFKHU, 1995, p. 203-5); 
this is addressed in more detail in the next section. 
 
Underlying its ideational understanding of institutions and its denial of material interests, 
constructivist institutionalism holds a radical position in the material-ideational debate. On 
the subject of political and economic crisis, Hay (2016) makes clear his position in the 
material-LGHDWLRQDOGHEDWHDUJXLQJWKDW³it is the very distinction between the ideational and 
the material itself that constructivists rejecW´ [emphasis added] (p. 531). Hay (2016) does 
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DUJXHWKDWZH³FDQXVHIXOO\GLIIHUHQWLDWH± and we should ± between the things we think go 
ZURQJWKHUHIHUHQWDQGRXUGLVFXUVLYHFRQVWUXDORIWKHP´p. EXWKHLVFOHDUWKDW³WKHUH
LVQRPDWHULDOERWWRPOLQH´WRDFULVLVEHFDXVH³WKHUHOHYDQWIDFWVKHUHDUHVRFLDOIDFWVDQG
VRFLDOIDFWVDUHVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWV´p.  531). In simple terms, Hay is arguing that, although we 
can distinguish between institutions and perceptions, institutions are nothing more than 
SHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHP7KHUHIRUHLQFRQWUDVWWRPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\¶VUHDOLVW
ontology, constructivist institutionalism offers a fundamentally constructivist ontology in 
three key ways: firstly, as discussed in the previous section, it denies the reality of 
IXQGDPHQWDOVRFLDOFRQFHSWVVXFKDVµWKHPDWHULDO¶DQGµWKHLGHDWLRQDO¶HLWKHUEHFDXVHWKH\
only exist as ontologically intertwined FRQVWLWXHQWVRIµPDWHULDO-LGHDWLRQDOFRPSOH[HV¶ or 
because they do not exist at all and are merely ways of understanding social processes; 
secondly, it argues that socially constructed perceptions and understandings comprise 
institutions and therefore drive institutional change; finally, it denies a role for material 
interests, arguing that interests only have a meaning as subjective constructions. 
 
 
6(&7,21+$<$1'*2)$6¶6),9(&5,7,&,6062)0253+2*(1(7,&7+(25< 
 
In their 2010 collaboration for the influential book The Role of Ideas in Political Analysis, 
Hay and Gofas lay five main criticisms against morphogenetic theory: (1) that there is a 
problematic conflation of the material and structural; (2) that there is a problematic dualism 
between structure and culture; (3) that there is no diachronic modelling of structural-cultural 
interaction; (4) that the conception of power is materialistic; and (5) that the conception of 
interests is materialistic. 
 
The main criticism offered by Hay and Gofas (2010) against morphogenetic theory is levelled 
DJDLQVW$UFKHU¶V³XQIRUWXQDWHFRQIODWLRQRIWKHPDWHULDODQGWKHVWUXFWXUH´ (p. 45), a 
conflation which they argue to be the ultimate source of the other weaknesses. In order to 
understand what Hay and Gofas mean by the material-structure conflation, it is necessary to 
tXUQWRDQRWKHURI+D\¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVLQZKLFKKHHPSKDVLVHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFOHDUO\
GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQ³PDWHULDOSK\VLFDOVWUXFWXUHVRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGVRFLDOSROLWLFDO
VWUXFWXUHVRQWKHRWKHU´+D\, 2009, p. 260). Hay (2009) very effectively uses the example of 
.LQJ&DQXWHDQGWKHWLGHLQRUGHUWRHPSKDVLVHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQµQDWXUDOVWUXFWXUHV¶
VXFKDVWKHWLGHDQGµVRFLR-SROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUHV¶VXFKDVWKHNLQJ¶VSXEOLFLPDJH8QOLNH
social structures, natural structures neither yield to agency nor synchronically emerge from 
agency, but they can still provide agents with opportunities and constraints and, although the 
laws of physics cannot be changed, the physical and natural world certainly can. Therefore, 
Hay (2009) argues for a clear (presumably analytical) distinction to be made between the 
natural/physical context and the social/political context in which agents act. This in turn leads 
Hay and Gofas (2010) to criticise the morphogenetic approach for conflating the two together 
in thHWHUPµVWUXFWXUH¶ 
 
The second criticism relates to the subsequent dualism between structure and culture (Hay & 
Gofas, 2010). Hay and Gofas (2010) offer a specific point of disagreement that seems to 
highlight their understanding of what differentiates analytical dualism from other approaches 
and what makes it an unsuitable approach for exploring structural-cultural interaction. They 
argue that the morphogenetic approach mistakenly assumes that all emergent properties of 
structure and culture are internal to themselves separately, rather than being emergent from 
the interrelation between them (Hay & Gofas, 2010). The unidentified implication of this is 
that any modelling of the material, ideational, structural or agential aspects of social life must 
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allow for the possibility that emergent properties can arise from combinations between the 
concepts and not just from each one separately.  
 
Thirdly, Hay and Gofas criticise morphogenesis for lacking a diachronic modelling of 
structural-cultural interaction. They refer a numbHURIWLPHVWR0F$QXOOD¶V) defence of 
PRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\DQGSDUWLFXODUO\KLVFRQFOXGLQJUHPDUNVWKDWPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\³LV
less than clear about what the relationship between the cultural and the structural is over 
WLPH´ (p. 290). Hay and Gofas (2010VXJJHVWWKDW³0F$QXOODFDQILQGQRGHYHORSHGDFFRXQW
of the relationship between culture and structure over time because, quite simply, there is 
QRQH´ (p. 46)7KH\DUJXHWKDWWKLVDEVHQFHLVFRQILUPHGE\$UFKHUZKHQVKH³UHVWULFW>V@Whe 
LQWHUSOD\RIFXOWXUHDQGVWUXFWXUHWRVRPHWKLQJWKDWRFFXUVRQO\LQWKHVHFRQGµVRFLR-cultural 
LQWHUDFWLRQ¶SKDVHRIWKHPRUSKRJHQHWLFF\FOH´ (Hay & Gofas, 2010, p. 46). This in turn 
prevents the modelling of structure and culture in a three-part morphogenetic cycle of the sort 
presented in Figure 1 for structural-agential and in Figure 2 for cultural-agential interaction. 
Therefore, what McAnulla sees as a theoretical gap waiting to be filled, Hay and Gofas see as 
an inevitable weakness of morphogenetic theory.  
  
Finally, we come to the interrelated accusations that morphogenesis posits a materialist 
conception of power and a materialist conception of interests. With regards to power, Hay 
and Gofas (2010DUJXHWKDWLQPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\³DFWRUVDUHseen to be empowered by 
WKHLUSRVLWLRQLQWKHVRFLDOKLHUDUFK\´ZKLFKLV³XQGHUVWRRGLQSXUHO\PDWHULDOWHUPV´ (pp. 45-
6). Therefore, they suggest that the morphogenetic cycle fails to acknowledge that actors may 
EHSRZHUIXO³E\YLUWXHRIDZLGHVSUHDGV\Vtem of meanings that accords them status, 
OHJLWLPDF\DQGRUDXWKRULW\´+D\& Gofas, 2010, p. 46). With regards to interests, Hay and 
*RIDVDUJXHWKDWPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\FRQFHLYHVRI³LQWHUHVWVDVPDWHULDOO\
GHWHUPLQHG´DQG³FRQFHLYHVRIDFWRUVLQ the process of socio-cultural integration as animated 
XOWLPDWHO\E\WKHLUPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWV´ (p. 45). The supposed source of these two strands of 
materialism is the dualism between structure and culture, because such a separation denies 
the complex interpenetration of structural and cultural effects (Hay & Gofas, 2010). It is for 
this reason that Hay and Gofas (2010³SUHIHUWRWDONRIDVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHZLWKLQWHUUHODWHGLI
QRQHWKHOHVVDQDO\WLFDOO\VHSDUDEOHLGHDWLRQDODQGPDWHULDOHOHPHQWV´ (p. 46).  
 
 
SECTION 7: A MORPHOGENETIC RESPONSE 
 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQDUHVSRQVHZLOOEHRIIHUHGWRHDFKRI+D\DQG*RIDV¶V (2010) five criticisms in 
turn. These responses broadly offer a defence of morphogenesis, but also make a number of 
concessions to Hay and Gofas on their identification of weaknesses and ambiguities in 
morphogenetic theory. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons that their critique and their 
constructivist institutionalist alternative are a particularly important challenge to 
morphogenetic theory. Although this section seeks to resist the challenge by defending and 
clarifying morphogenetic theory, it is ultimately argued that further work is needed to 
strengthen the morphogenetic model of structural-cultural interaction. 
 
Criticism 1: that there is a problematic conflation of the material and structural in 
morphogenetic theory.  
 
Archer (1995) XVHVWKHWHUPµVWUXFWXUH¶LQFRQWUDVWWRµFXOWXUH¶VRWKDWWKHIRUPHUKDVD
³SULPDU\GHSHQGHQFHXSRQPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHV´p. 175), while the latter is composed of 
µintelligibilia¶D WHUPWKDWFDSWXUHVDOOWKRVHLWHPVWKDWDUH³FDSDEOHRIEHLQJJUDVSHG
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deciphered, understood or known by VRPHRQH´$UFKHUS 104). However, in a 
significant minority of instances, Archer (1995) XVHVWKHWHUPµVWUXFWXUH¶WRFDSWXUH³all 
structural influences (i.e. the generative powers of [both] structural emergent properties and 
FXOWXUDOHPHUJHQWSURSHUWLHV´p. 7KHUHIRUHµVWUXFWXUH¶LVXVHGVSHFLILFDOO\WRPHDQ
material structures but also generally to refer to the social context (including both its material 
and ideational elements). Porpora (1989) QDUURZVWKHPHDQLQJRIVWUXFWXUHGHILQLQJLW³DV
systems of human relationshipVDPRQJVRFLDOSRVLWLRQV´S 198), which for the current 
debate is more usefully worded as ³HPHUJHQWO\PDWHULDOVRFLDOUHODWLRQV´Porpora, 1993, p. 
³$OWKRXJKHPHUJHQWO\PDWHULDOVRFLDOUHODWLRQVDUHJHQHUDWHGE\FXOWXUDOFRQVWLWXWLYH
UXOHVWKRVHUHODWLRQVLQGHSHQGHQWO\DIIHFWWKHZD\VLQZKLFKVLWXDWHGDFWRUVWKLQNDQGDFW´
(Porpora, 1993, p. 212). Crucially, for Porpora, WKHµPDWHULDOLVP¶RIPDWHULDOUHODWLRQVGRHV
not refer to their direct dependence on physical resources or their manifestation in physical 
reality, but instead refers to their independence from human understanding (Porpora, 2018). 
On this basis, structure could relate directly to physical reality, such as a relation between the 
strength of two boxers or between the food rations of two castaways, but structural relations 
do not necessarily relate directly to physical reality and could be based on cultural rules, such 
as the relative positioning of a manager and an assistant or of a professor and undergraduate 
(Porpora, 20167KHUHIRUHLIµWKHPDWHULDO¶LVWDNHQWRPHDQHPHUJHQWVRFLDOUHODWLRQVWKDW
are ontologically distinct from human understanding, then morphogenetic theorists would 
readily accept that they conflate the material and structural and would argue that this is a 
strength of the approach rather than a weakness. However, if as Hay (2009) seems to imply, 
µthe material¶ LVWDNHQWRPHDQµSK\VLFDOUHDOLW\¶DQGWKHµQDWXUDOZRUOG¶WKHQWKHVLWXDWLRQLV
less clear. 
 
With Archer (1995) VWDWLQJWKDWVWUXFWXUDOHPHUJHQWSURSHUWLHVKDYHD³SULPDU\GHSHQGHQFH
upon material resources, both pK\VLFDODQGKXPDQ´S 175), it seems that morphogenesis has 
QRWWUDGLWLRQDOO\RIIHUHGDFOHDUHQRXJKGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµemergently material social 
UHODWLRQV¶DQGµQDWXUDOUHDOLW\¶'HVSLWHLWVSUREOHPVDWWKH ontological level, constructivist 
institutionalism offers a clear analytical delineation between actor, natural context, ideational 
context, and institutional context. It is not that morphogenetic theory lacks a 
conceptualisation of each of these concepts, but rather that only three of them form the meta-
theoretical core as structure, agency and culture (Archer, 2013). In Being Human, Archer 
(2000b) highlights the importance of our natural embodiment in the world and our practical 
relations with the world that occur ³QRWWKURXJKWKHPDQLSXODWLRQRIV\PEROVEXWRIDUWHIDFWV´
(p. 166). Archer therefore not only incorporates the natural world into morphogenetic theory 
through KHUWKHRULVDWLRQRIWKHµQDWXUDODQGSUDFWLFDORUGHUVRIUHDOLW\¶EXWVKHDOVRH[SORUHV
the interaction over time between the natural world and human agency. However, in order to 
provide greater clarity on the place of the natural context alongside the structural and cultural 
contexts of an agent, it is necessary to draw it into the meta-theoretical core of morphogenetic 
theory, so that the agency-culture-structure trio that is currently maintained (Archer, 2013) 
becomes a quartet by establishing a theoretical place for the natural/physical/practical 
context.  
 
Criticism 2: that there is a problematic ontological dualism between structure and culture in 
morphogenetic theory.  
 
The accusation that there is an ontological dualism between structure and culture is based on 
WKHVDPHSUHPLVHDV+D\¶VHDUOLHUFULWLFLVPRIWKHVWUXFWXUH-agency dualism. As with 
structure-agency, morphogenetic theory is clear that the ontological relationship between 
structure and culture is overlapping and intertwining, and can therefore be labelled an 
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µRQWRORJLFDOGXDOLW\¶$WWKHDQDO\WLFDOOHYHOLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRDUWLILFLDOO\VHSDUDWHVWUXFWXUH
DQGFXOWXUHLQWRDQµDQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVP¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLULQWHUDFWLRQ
over time. At an ontological level, the fundamental dualities between structure, culture, 
agency and (now also) µnature¶ are underpinned by necessary relations of synchronic 
emergence. 
 
The notion of emergence put forward by Archer is almost entirely focussed on the way in 
which both structure and culture synchronically emerge from agency. However, Porpora 
(1993; 2015) offers a crucial elaboration, explaining how structures, conceptualised as 
³HPHUJHQWO\PDWHULDOVRFLDOUHODWLRQV´emerge from both culture and agency. Structures 
HPHUJHIURPFXOWXUHEHFDXVHFXOWXUDOHOHPHQWVVXFKDVµFRQVWLWXWLYHUXOHV¶LGHDV, and 
language are almost always central to the very existence of structures (Porpora, 2015). 
Similarly, structures emerge from agency because they are themselves relations between 
agents and because it is only through agents that they exert any causal force (Archer, 1995; 
Porpora, 2015). In order to stand by the commitment of establishing a place IRUµQDWXUH¶LQ
the theoretical core of morphogenetic theory, it is necessary to include it in the chain of 
synchronic emergence. Therefore, at an ontological level, we can postulate four social forces 
existing in overlapping and intertwining relations of emergence... from nature emerges 
agency... from nature and agency emerges culture... from nature, agency and culture emerges 
structure. 
 
Criticism 3: that there is no diachronic modelling of structural-cultural interaction in 
morphogenetic theory. 
 
It seemVWKDWLQERWK+D\DQG*RIDV¶V (2010) FULWLTXHDQGLQ$UFKHU¶V (1995; 1996) writing 
on morphogenetic theory, the central issue with regards to structural-cultural interaction is the 
FODLPWKDW³ZKHQERWKVWUXFWXUHDQGFXOWXUHDUHFRQFHSWXDOLVHGIURPWKHPRrphogenetic 
perspective then the two intersect in the middle element of the basic cycle´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 
305). In direct response to Criticism 3, it can be flatly rejected that morphogenetic theory 
offers no diachronic modelling of structural-cultural interaction (see Archer, 1996, pp. 284-
287; Archer, 1995, pp. 305-328; Porpora, 2015, pp. 175-187). But it is not satisfactory simply 
to point the reader towards existing morphogenetic writings, because there are problems with 
ERWKRI$UFKHU¶VPDLQVWUDQGVRIDUJXPHQWRQWKLVLVVXHDWKHSUREOHPZLWK$UFKHU¶VFODLP
about the LQWHUVHFWLRQLQWKHµPLGGOHHOHPHQW¶LVWKDWKHUWKHRUHWLFDOPRGHOOLQJRIWKHPLGGOH
element of the basic cycle is limited in scope and theoretically problematic; (b) where Archer 
does present a cohesive morphogenetic model of structural-cultural interaction, she does not 
conceptualise this interaction as occurring in the middle element of the basic cycle, which not 
only contradicts the earlier claim, but also limits the explanatory power of the model. 
 
(a) Archer (1995; 1996) DUJXHVWKDWLQPRUSKRJHQHWLFWKHRU\³WKH basic mechanism by 
ZKLFKFXOWXUDOIDFWRUVILQGWKHLUZD\LQWRWKHVWUXFWXUDOILHOG´LVDVIROORZV³OHWDQ\PDWHULDO
interest group ... endorse any doctrine ... for the advancement of those interests ... and that 
JURXSLVLPPHGLDWHO\SOXQJHGLQWRLWVVLWXDWLRQDOORJLF´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 306; 1996, p. 284). 
6LPLODUO\³VWUXFWXUDOIDFWRUVILQGWKHLUZD\LQWRWKHFXOWXUDOILHOGE\IROORZLQJWKHVDPH
SDWK´³OHWWKHDGYRFDF\RI any doctrine ... become associate with a particular material 
LQWHUHVWJURXSDQGLWVIDWHEHFRPHVHPEURLOHGLQWKHIRUWXQHVRIWKDWJURXS´$UFKHU, 1995, 
pp. 306-7; 1996, p. 286). There is no indication that this discussion of interest groups is 
merely an example of structural-cultural interaction; rather, it is made clear that this is the 
mechanism through which structural-cultural interaction occurs in the middle element of the 
basic cycle. Aside from being a rather limited foray into the multitude of ways in which 
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VWUXFWXUHDQGFXOWXUHFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGWRLQWHUDFWWKLVµLQWHUHVWJURXSH[SODQDWLRQ¶LV
undermined by the way in which Archer conceptualises interest groups.  
 
The middle element of the morphogenetic cycle is explored by Archer (1995) on the basis of 
a distinction between two types of interest groupµSULPDU\DJHQWV¶ZKLFKDUHKHOGWREH
unorganised groups of individuals who share interests (though they may not be aware of 
WKHPVHOYHVDVDJURXSRUDZDUHRIWKHLUVKDUHGLQWHUHVWVDQGµFRUSRUDWHDJHQWV¶ZKLFKLQ
contrast, are held to be organised around the articulation and pursuit of their shared interests 
(so that they are necessarily aware of themselves as a group and aware of their interests). The 
problem with these concepts arises when we consider the distinction between primary agents 
and corporate agents alongside attempts to model structural-cultural interaction in the middle 
HOHPHQWRIWKHPRUSKRJHQHWLFF\FOHµ&RUSRUDWHDJHQWV¶DUHorganised interest groups, to the 
H[WHQWWKDW³WKHy are social subjects with reasons for attempting to bring about certain 
RXWFRPHV´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 260); WKH\WKHUHIRUHILWLQWR$UFKHU¶VPHFKDQLVPRIVWUXFWXUDO-
cultural interaction presented in the previous paragraph because, as organised interest groups, 
WKH\DUHFDSDEOHRIµHQGRUVLQJDGRFWULQH¶+RZHYHUµSULPDU\DJHQWV¶FDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG
WREHSDUWRIWKLVPHFKDQLVPEHFDXVHDVDJURXSRISHRSOHZKR³QHLWKHUH[SUHVVLQWHUHVWVQRU
RUJDQLVHIRUWKHLUSXUVXLW´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 259), they are unable WRµHQGRUVHDGRFWULQH¶
Although Archer could respond to this discrepancy by directing readers to her argument that 
corporate agents control morphogenesis while primary agents merely have unintentional 
collective effects, this is not the same as defending the problematic implication that 
structural-cultural interaction only occurs in relation to corporate interest groups. 
 
Furthermore, the distinction between primary and corporate agents creates a further problem, 
because it undermines the clarity of the distinction between the middle element of the 
VWUXFWXUDOF\FOHµVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶DQGWKHPLGGOHHOHPHQWRIWKHFXOWXUDOF\FOHµVRFLR-
FXOWXUDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶%HFDXVH³WKHSULPDU\VRFLDOFRQWH[WGHOLQHDWHVFROOHFWLYHVLQWKHVDPH
SRVLWLRQ´$UFKHU, 1995, p. µSULPDU\DJHQWV¶DUHGHILQHGE\WKHGLVWULEXWLRQVRIWKH
structural and cultural context. In this case, the distinction between the structural and cultural 
domains can be maintained as existing between the material interest groups produced by 
social structure and the ideal interest groups produced by the cultural system. In contrast, 
µFRUSRUDWHDJHQWV¶DV³VHOI-conscious vested interest groups, promotive interest groups, social 
PRYHPHQWVDQGGHIHQFHDVVRFLDWLRQV´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 258), are defined as single 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOXQLWV&OHDUO\LQRUGHUWREHFRPHµVRFLDOVXEMHFWV¶DQGEHFDSDEOHRI
µDGYRFDWLQJDGRFWULQH¶FRUSRUDWHDJHQWVPXVWWDNHWKHIRUPRIGLVWLQFWorganisations. This 
creates the following problem: how do we differentiate between a material corporate agent 
and an ideal corporate agent? All corporate agents are positioned within the cultural system, 
to the extent that they use language and ideas, and all corporate agents are positioned within 
the structural system to the extent that they are composed of relations between individuals. 
7KXVDWWKHPLGGOHHOHPHQWRIWKHF\FOHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶
VWUXFWXUDODQGµVRFLR-FXOWXUDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶FXOWXUDOFDQQRORQJHUEHFOHDUO\PDLQWDLQHG
Analytical dualism, central to morphogenetic models of interaction, is undermined by a 
blurring of the structural and cultural in the middle element of the basic cycle. 
 
(b) In a more promising approach, Archer (1995, pp. 306-324) models structural-cultural 
interaction between the outcomes of the two cycles. Where both the structural and cultural 
cycles lead to morphostasis (no structural/cultural change), the stability of each reinforces the 
stability of the other (Figure 3). Where one leads to morphogenesis (structural/cultural 
change) and the other to morphostasis, the change in the former disrupts the stability of the 
latter. When both lead to morphogenesis, the change in each enhances the change of the other 
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(Figure 4). This model of interaction between structure and culture is a much clearer, more 
widely-applicable, and less problematic line of argument than the one Archer presents in 
relation to interest groups. However, two qualifying comments have to be made about this 
model. Firstly, Figures 3 and 4 clearly illustrate that this interaction does not occur in the 
middle element of the morphogenetic cycle; it instead occurs between cycles, so that a 
structural and a cultural cycle occur in parallel and the results of each intersect influencing 
future cycles. Secondly, and consequently, this approach, as depicted in Figures 3 and 4, only 
offers explanation of structural-cultural interaction at a macro-level, which Archer (1995) 
GHVFULEHVDVµWKLUG-RUGHU¶ HPHUJHQFHXVHGWRH[SODLQWKH³results of the results of the results 
of VRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ´S.  
 
FIGURE 3 ± cultural-structural morphostasis (Archer 1995) 
 
FIGURE 4 ± cultural-structural morphogenesis (Archer 1995) 
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:HFDQWXUQWR3RUSRUD¶VReconstructing Sociology as a more recent attempt to 
provide a specific explanation of the elusive model of structural-cultural interaction. Porpora 
seems to conceive of a closer interaction between the structural and cultural by stating that 
³ZLWKLQWKHLUVWUXFWXUHGSRVLWLRQVDULVLQJIURPDQLQLWLDOVHWRI>FXOWXUDO@UXOHVDJHQWV¶
VWUXJJOHVPD\FKDQJHWKH>FXOWXUDO@UXOHVDQGKHQFHWKHVWUXFWXUHVDQGWKHLUIXWXUHDFWLRQV´
(Porpora, 2015, p. 3RUSRUDLVFOHDUWKDWDOWKRXJK³SDUWLFXODUVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVPD\YDU\
WKHUHZLOODOZD\VEHVRPHVWUXFWXUH´DQGDOWKRXJK³UHDVRQVwill vary historically with 
cultural backgrounds ... in all times and in all SODFHVSHRSOHZLOOEHPRWLYDWHGE\UHDVRQV´
(pp. 180-1). Therefore, although he seeks to explain structural-cultural interaction from the 
morphogenetic perspective, Porpora seems WRKDYHDEDQGRQHGWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµVRFLDO
LQWHUDFWLRQ¶DQGµVRFLR-FXOWXUDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶+RZHYHULIWKHVWUXFWXUDOF\FOHDQGFXOWXUDO
cycle are considered to be necessarily operating simultaneously in parallel, and if the two 
intersect at the middle element of the two cycles, and if the distinction between the two 
middle elements has been abandoned, we are still left with the question: how do structure and 
culture interact in the middle element of the morphogenetic cycle? Although this paper does 
not have the space to offer a detailed model, it can be argued that the answer lies in drawing 
an analytical dualism not between cultural and structural agents but between the cultural and 
structural powers of agents. 
 
Criticism 4: that the morphogenetic conception of power is materialistic. 
 
Hay and Gofas (2010) argue that in morphogenesis there is no appreciation that individuals 
DUHSRZHUIXO³E\YLUWXHRIDZLGHVSUHDGV\VWHPRIPHDQLQJVWKDWDFFRUGVWKHPVWDWXV
OHJLWLPDF\DQGRUDXWKRULW\´p. 46). It is possible to offer a rather simple response to this 
charge: this type of power is acknowledged by morphogenesis but not as a constituent of 
culture. It is instead held to be a materially emergent social relation that belongs to the 
structural realm (Porpora, 2015)7KHUHIRUHDOWKRXJKµDZLGHVSUHDGV\VWHPRIPHDQLQJV¶
ZRXOGEHLGHQWLILHGDVEHORQJLQJWRFXOWXUHWKHUHVXOWDQWµVWDWXVOHJLWLPDF\DQGDXWKRULW\¶DUH
structural elements because they are social relations.  
 
Although this very brief response diUHFWO\DGGUHVVHV+D\DQG*RIDV¶VFULWLFLVPZHFDQPRYH
EH\RQGQRWLRQVRIµSRZHURYHU¶WRFRQVLGHUWKHFDXVDOSRZHUVRIWKHFXOWXUDOV\VWHPDQGWKH
causal powers agents have in their reaction to it. It is by delineating these types of power that 
we can lay the foundations for an explanation of cultural-structural interaction. As Archer 
(1996) explains in detail in Culture and Agency, the cultural system exerts a causal power 
upon agents, particularly as a result of the logical contradictions and complementarities that 
exist between ideas. As well as theorising the power of the systemic level, morphogenetic 
WKHRU\FUXFLDOO\LQVLVWVRQ³WKHTXLQWHVVHQWLDOSRZHURIKXPDQDJHQF\WRUHDFWZLWKRULJLQDOLW\
whateYHULWVFLUFXPVWDQFHV´$UFKHUS 187; for a discussion of agency and power in 
morphogenesis, see Vogler, 2016). It therefore makes sense to assume that agents have 
powers relevant to each, so that any individual has a degree of cultural power in their 
negotiation of the cultural system, including an ability to think creatively, imagine new 
possibilities and negotiate contradictions between ideas, but also has as a degree of material 
power in their negotiation of the material structure. Agents who hold vast amounts of 
knowledge and/or adhere to a set of complementary beliefs have a cultural power by virtue of 
their positioning within the cultural system, while those who have been denied such 
knowledge and/or adhere to a set of contradictory beliefs will have relatively less cultural 
power. These cultural powers are not relational, as they do not entail power over other 
individuals. Instead they are powers that agents have to resist, adopt, change, or create ideas. 
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In the structural domain, agents do have powers over others, but they also have powers to 
resist, join, change, or create institutions. 
 
In summary, morphogenetic theory does allow for the possibility that agents can hold 
relational SRZHUHJ³VWDWXVOHJLWLPDF\DQGRUDXWKRULW\´³E\YLUWXHRIDZLGHVSUHDG
V\VWHPRIPHDQLQJV´EXWWKHVHSRZHUs are part of the material structure. That such powers 
are partly constituted by cultural meanings is accounted for in the morphogenetic assumption 
that structure synchronically emerges from culture. However, aside from relational power 
LHSRZHUDVµSRZHURYHU¶ZHPXVWDOVRFRQVLGHUWKHFXOWXUDOFDXVDOSRZHURIWKHFXOWXUDO
system and the cultural causal power agents have in reaction to it.  
 
Criticism 5: that the morphogenetic conception of interests is materialistic. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to address the question of interests. A central feature of constructivist 
institutionalism is the explicit rejection of material interests because their acknowledgement 
is supposedly a denial of social construction and a denial of the reflexivity of the agent (Hay, 
2011a). Therefore, rather than Hay and Gofas (2010) having identified a materialist bias in 
the morphogenetic conception of interests, they have instead offered a wholesale rejection of 
material interests. It would therefore make more sense to say that while morphogenesis 
includes both material and ideational conceptions of interests, constructivist institutionalism 
offers a purely ideational understanding of interests. Not only does morphogenesis claim to 
balance cultural and material interests, it also claims that it is possible, and indeed necessary, 
to acknowledge the reflexivity of the agent within any conception of interests. Furthermore, 
DOWKRXJKWKHPRUSKRJHQHWLFPRGHOVWURQJO\RSSRVHV+D\¶VYLHZWKDWVRFLDOIRUFHVDUH
comprised entirely of social constructions, it is underpinned by a critical realist position that 
accepts that agents always perceive of themselves, their ideas, and their external 
environments through socially constructed understandings. Therefore, in order to respond to 
Hay DQG*RIDV¶VDFFXVDWLRQRIPDWHULDOLVPLQWKHWKHRULVLQJRILQWHUHVWVLWLVQHFHVVDU\WR
show how morphogenesis (a) allows for both material and ideational (cultural) interests, (b) 
maintains the reflexive power of agency, and (c) acknowledges the role of social 
construction. 
 
(a) The main difference between the morphogenetic and the constructivist institutionalist 
position on interests is that morphogenesis applies analytical dualisms in order to distinguish 
different types of interest, whereas constructivist institutionalism conflates these various 
types together as the socially constructed perspectives of individuals. By applying an 
DQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVPEHWZHHQWKHDJHQWDQGWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[W$UFKHUSRVLWVµYHVWHG
LQWHUHVWV¶, which are interests loaded into positions within the social context. This includes 
interests that are inherent constituents of the roles that agents occupy in material structure 
and inherent constituents of the beliefs that they hold in the cultural system (Archer, 1995). 
BecauVHERWKWKHVWUXFWXUDODQGFXOWXUDOFRQWH[WVDUHKHOGWRSURYLGHDJHQWVZLWKµYHVWHG
LQWHUHVWV¶LWLVSRVVLEOHWRDUJXHWKDWPRUSKRJHQHVLVallows for both material and ideational 
interests.  
 
(b) These interests condition agents through the costs associated with flouting them and the 
benefits associated with adherence. However, this does not mean that they determine 
EHKDYLRXUEHFDXVHDJHQWVDUHDOZD\VSXUVXLQJSURMHFWVEHWKH\³WKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRI
biologically grounded needs [or] the utopian reconstructiRQRIVRFLHW\´ or anything in 
between (Archer, 1995, p. 198). The conditioning effects of the social context (cultural or 
structural) only ever operate through the projects that agents undertake, because constraints 
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and enablements only exist in relation tR³WKHSDUWLFXODUSURMHFWVRISDUWLFXODUDJHQWVLQ
SDUWLFXODUSRVLWLRQV´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 198). This allows for a third type of interest beyond 
WKHYHVWHGLQWHUHVWVRIWKHVWUXFWXUDODQGFXOWXUDOFRQWH[WWKHµUHDO¶Lnterests of agents (Archer 
1995, p. 20$JHQWVPD\ZHOOGHILQHWKHLURZQµUHDOLQWHUHVWV¶FRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWO\WRWKH
vested interests inherent in their structural role(s) and/or cultural belief(s). When they do act 
against their vested interests, a common cost that an agent pays is the loss of the associated 
structural role or cultural belief, though other additional/alternative costs are conceivable. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the morphogenetic model defends structural and cultural 
interests while maintaining the reflexive power of the agent. 
 
(c) A key tenet of constructivist institutionalism is that all individual perspectives are social 
constructions. Therefore, when agents form their interests, they have social constructions 
about what they attach value to, social constructions about their strategically selective context 
and social constructions about their own abilities (Hay, 2016). There is no reason why a 
morphogenetic perspective cannot incorporate these different layers of social construction. 
Indeed, the critical realist position on which morphogenesis builds insists that all knowledge 
is socially constructed. However, while the inclusion of social construction leads Hay (2016) 
WRDUJXHWKDW³WKHUHLVQRPDWHULDOERWWRPOLQHWREHIRXQG´(p. 531) and consequently no 
material interests (Hay, 2011a), it would instead lead morphogenetic theorists to reassert the 
importance of analytical dualism. The analytical dualisms of morphogenetic theory allow for 
the consideration of the inherently socially constructed perspective of the agent, while 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\DFFHSWLQJWKDWDQDJHQW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLVQHFHVVDULO\of something. This 
VRPHWKLQJH[LVWVLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VNQRZOHGJHDQGH[HUWVDFDXVDOIRUFH
WKURXJKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIDFWLRQWKHVHFRQVHTXHQFHV³FDQQRWVimply be dissolved into 
VXEMHFWLYHFRQVWUXFWLRQV´$UFKHU, 1995, p. 203). As Porpora (2015DUJXHV³ZKLOHSHRSOH
may recognise themselves to be in crisis, the recognition follows rather than creates the crisis, 
which can obtain whether people recognise it RUQRW´ (p. 182). 
 
In summary, morphogenesis allows for the identification of material interests, ideational 
(cultural) interests, and agential interests, while simultaneously accepting the social 
construction of each. In contrast, Hay excludes the possibility of material interests, a key 
mechanism through which the social context conditions the individual. It is not that the 
morphogenetic theory of interests is materialist, but that the constructivist institutionalist 
theory of interests is idealist, a reductionist position that weakens the worthy project of 
uniting social constructivism with institutional analysis. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By focussing on +D\¶VDQG+D\DQG*RIDV¶V critiques of morphogenesis, this 
article has offered defences, clarifications and modifications that seek to contribute towards 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPRUSKRJHQHWLFH[SODQDWRU\IUDPHZRUN,QGHDOLQJZLWK+D\¶V
ILUVWFULWLTXHDGHIHQFHDQGFODULILFDWLRQRIWKHFHQWUDOPRUSKRJHQHWLFFRQFHSWRIµDQDO\WLFDO
GXDOLVP¶ZDVRIIHUHG+D\¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWDQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVPLQHYLWDEO\KDUGHQVLQWR
ontological dualism was rejected on the basis that morphogenetic theory insists on the 
necessarily overlapping and intertwining relationship between key causal forces, particularly 
structure and agency, and particularly because their ontological relationship is one of 
synchronic emergence. Furthermore, a counter-critique was offered that questioned the 
FRPSDWLELOLW\EHWZHHQ+D\¶VRZQVWUXFWXUH-DJHQF\PRGHODPRGLILHGYHUVLRQRI-HVVRS¶s 
strategic-relational approach) and his nominalist assumption that structure and agency have 
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QRH[LVWHQFHLQUHDOLW\DQDVVXPSWLRQWKDW-HVVRSKLPVHOIH[SOLFLWO\UHMHFWV7KHUHIRUH+D\¶V
first critique of morphogenesis has been rejected without any need to question existing 
morphogenetic concepts; though, the process of the defence gave clarity to both positions and 
to the disagreement between them.  
 
With regards to Hay and Gofas¶V (2010) critique, they offered five criticisms against the 
morphogenetic modelling of structure-culture. Partly on the basis of this more troubling 
critique, Hay (2006; 2011a; KDVDGYRFDWHGWKHDOWHUQDWLYHSRVLWLRQRIµFRQVWUXFWLYLVW
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶in which he has entrenched his constructivist denial of ontological 
distinctions, such as the one between structure and agency and the one between the ideational 
and the material. Aside from this problematic ontological assertion, constructivist 
institutionalism effectively establishes a central role for socially constructed perspectives as 
drivers of institutional change (Hay, 2016). These social constructions are held by Hay 
WREHXELTXLWRXVOHDGLQJKLPWRH[FOXGHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµDPDWHULDOERWWRPOLQH¶DQG
therefore to exclude the possibility of material interests. In response, this article has clarified 
the possibility, and indeed necessity, of theorising material interests in morphogenetic theory. 
This is again based on analytical dualism, allowing the separation of agential interests, 
cultural interests and material interests. Although constructivist institutionalism shares a great 
deal in common with morphogenetic theory and makes a number of important theoretical 
assertions, its denial of the ontological distinctions between agency, culture and structure are 
problematic because (a) they undermine the justification of using such concepts and 
distinctions at the analytical level, and (b) they undermine the possibility that social causes 
(e.g. institutions and material interests) exist as anything more than socially constructed 
perceptions. 
 
,QUHVSVRQVHWR+D\DQG*RIDV¶VILYHFULWLFLVPVWKLVDUWLFOHKDVVRXJKWWRRIIHUFODULW\
RQ$UFKHU¶VGHILQLWLRQRIµVWUXFWXUH¶E\WXUQLQJWR3RUSRUD¶VµPDWHULDOO\HPHUJHQW
VRFLDOUHODWLRQV¶$GGLWLRQDOO\DQGmore importantly, it has argued that morphogenetic theory 
must be modified to allow for the place of the physical and natural world within the structure-
culture-agency formulation, perhaps but not necessarily under the conceptual label of 
µQDWXUH¶%\DJDLQDVVHUWLQJWKHFRQFHSWVRIµDQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVP¶DQGµV\QFKURQLFHPHUJHQFH¶
clarity was also offered on the ontological chain of emergence that is held to exist between 
DJHQF\FXOWXUHVWUXFWXUHDQGQRZDOVRµQDWXUH¶7KLVFDXVDOFKDLQLVDVIROORZVIUom nature 
emerges agency, from nature and agency emerges culture, and from nature, agency and 
culture emerges structure. Finally, this article has identified problems with the morphogenetic 
theorisation of structural-cultural interaction, but has argued that the solutions to these 
problems already lie within the theory. Specifically, a distinction between the material causal 
powers of agents and the cultural causal powers of agents can open up the analytical dualism 
necessary to model structural-cultural interaction through the middle element of the 
morphogenetic cycle.  
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